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ABSTRACT 
Vicarious learning is a vital component of organizational learning. We theorize and model two 
fundamental processes underlying vicarious learning: observation of actions (learning what they 
do) vs. belief sharing (learning what they think). The analysis of our model points to three key 
insights. First, vicarious learning through either process is beneficial even when no agent in a 
system of vicarious learners begins with a knowledge advantage. Second, vicarious learning 
through belief sharing is not universally better than mutual observation of actions and outcomes. 
Specifically, enabling mutual observability of actions and outcomes is superior to sharing of 
beliefs when the task environment features few alternatives with large differences in their value 
and there are no time pressures. Third, symmetry in vicarious learning in fact adversely affects 
belief sharing but improves observational learning. All three results are shown to be the 
consequence of how vicarious learning affects self-confirming biased beliefs.  
Keywords: Vicarious Learning; Organizational Learning; Organization Design 
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Learning from the experience of others, a.k.a “vicarious learning” is an important component of 
organizational learning. It can occur at different levels of aggregation (e.g. individuals, groups, 
and companies) and between as well as within organizations. Vicarious learning can serve as an 
important source of organizational advantage by improving the utilization of experience within 
and between organizations (Argote, 2012; Szulanski, 1996). However, despite its centrality to 
organizational learning, the micro-foundations of vicarious learning have remained largely 
under-theorized (Bresman, 2010, p. 93; Darr, Argote, and Epple, 1995, p. 1761).   
Vicarious learning is known to potentially unfold through two different processes – 
learning from observing the experiences of others (i.e. “observational learning”) (e.g. Gaba and 
Terlaak, 2013) and learning the beliefs that others have formed based on their own experiences 
(i.e. “belief exchange” or “knowledge transfer”, (e.g. Argote, 2012, Chapter 6)). While the 
distinction between these processes is intuitive, the implications of this distinction are yet to be 
theoretically developed. For instance, observational learning often presumes a knowledge 
differential (Levin and Cross, 2004; Osterloh and Frey, 2000). Does this mean that it is not 
useful in the absence of such a differential? Would the answer differ in the case of belief 
sharing? Myers (2018) proposes that bidirectional belief sharing between a learner and a model 
through “coactive vicarious learning” offers several benefits in terms of organizational learning. 
Yet it is unclear if it is the belief sharing relative to observational learning that is advantageous, 
or the symmetry. Well-known pathologies such as “groupthink” curtail organizational learning 
by reducing diversity of beliefs (Janis, 1972), and symmetry can also arise in observational 
learning.  
A deeper understanding of the micro-foundations of vicarious learning is, in general, 
useful for scholars interested in organizational learning as well as practitioners of knowledge 
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management in organizations (Argote, 2015). Considerations of how to improve vicarious 
learning also potentially relate to contemporary challenges around how to organize remote 
working and distributed teams (Ortiz de Guinea, Webster, and Staples, 2012), and collaboration 
between humans and algorithms (Agrawal, Gans, and Goldfarb, 2018). Accordingly, our goal is 
to model the two processes of vicarious learning – belief sharing and observational learning – 
explicitly at the dyadic level to understand them better, and then extend the analysis to larger 
systems. We draw on well-established models of individual associative (reinforcement) learning 
to build a model of vicarious learning in dyads (see Heyes, 2018, Chapter 3; Puranam, Stieglitz, 
Osman, and Pillutla, 2015). Uniquely, we are able to compare models of observation vs. belief 
sharing in the same task environments with the same interacting agents, and thus study the 
relative and combined performance of a dyad using either form of vicarious learning.  
Our central finding is that both processes of vicarious learning – belief sharing (i.e. 
learning “what they think”) and observational learning (i.e. learning “what they do”) can be 
useful even in the absence of any ex-ante knowledge differential among learners. However, there 
are also important differences between these processes in terms of effective vicarious learning. In 
particular, observational learning can outperform belief sharing when the task environment is 
such that there are relatively few alternatives to search, there are large differences in payoffs 
associated with alternatives, and there is no time pressure. These results arise primarily from one 
mechanism: both observational learning and belief sharing reduces the impact of self-confirming 
biased beliefs on learning but to different degrees.  
Self-confirming biased beliefs refer to a form of inaccuracy in beliefs that is self-
perpetuating because acting according to these beliefs prevents their falsification (e.g. Denrell 
and March, 2001; Battigalli, Francetich, Lanzani, and Marinacci, 2019). We also explain how 
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self-confirming biased beliefs are related to but distinct from self-confirming equilibria 
(Fudenberg and Levine, 1993; Battigalli, Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, and Marinacci, 2015), 
confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998), sticking points (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2002), and “hot-
stove” effects (Denrell and March, 2001).  
The intuition for the mechanism can be stated as follows: vicarious learning improves 
performance over individual isolated learning even without an initial knowledge differential 
between learners because it produces information on counterfactuals for the individual learner. 
Moreover, this benefit of vicarious learning exists even when the observation is incomplete (i.e., 
observing either action or outcome only) as long as learners can infer counterfactuals. However, 
because actions across agents become more strongly correlated through belief sharing than 
observational learning, this also causes a narrowing of the scope of attempted actions, and 
therefore of the range of counterfactuals on which information is generated. This results in a 
relative disadvantage of belief sharing compared to observational learning when the task 
environment is relatively small, payoffs vary widely across actions and there are no time 
constraints. A surprising result is that the advantage of belief sharing when it exists comes not 
from the superior insight of any individual learner ex-ante, but from the way the system of 
vicarious learners curtails the scope of the search, thereby minimizing the opportunity cost of 
exploration, albeit at the risk of being subject to self-confirming biased beliefs. 
The implications for managerial interventions (including the design of technologies) that 
support vicarious learning are that they must be contingent on the task environment. In human-
algorithm collaborative decision making, for instance, investing in “explainability” of an 
algorithm’s reasons for a decision to humans (Lipton, 2018) may not always be beneficial in 
terms of combined learning outcomes (though there may well be independent regulatory or 
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ethical reasons for it), and distributed work may sometimes be better supported by technologies 
that allow a fairly thin slice of mutual observability (e.g. Cramton, 2001) rather than rich 
interactions that support belief sharing (Kiesler and Cummings, 2002). The properties of the task 
environment analysed in the model point to the contingencies under which these propositions 
hold. 
PRIOR LITERATURE 
Vicarious learning involves learning from the experiences of others (Argote and Ingram, 
2000; Cyert and March, 1963). It provides a surrogate source of inputs to learning, without 
forcing the focal agent to directly experience the successes and failures that are the normal grist 
to the mill of experiential learning (Bresman, Birkinshaw, and Nobel, 1999). By affecting the 
economics of the utilization of experience as a scarce resource, vicarious learning by individuals 
within organizations as well as between organizations can affect organizational performance 
(Argote, 2012; Posen and Chen, 2013; Szulanski, 1996). This is routinely reflected in 
organizational phenomena that range from the micro (e.g. mentoring of new hires – Taylor, 
Russ-Eft, and Chan, 2005) to the macro (competitive intelligence that firms derive by studying 
each other’s patents, market expansions, and product launches – Greve, 1998, 2000). 
Different forms of vicarious learning have been studied in considerable detail by scholars 
from different backgrounds. For instance, imitating other’s practice has been viewed as a key 
driver of the diffusion of practices (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) as well as competitive 
dynamics between firms (e.g., Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Posen and Chen, 2013). On the other 
hand, the studies on best practice or knowledge transfer have emphasized that an organization 
extrapolates its past (successful) experience by enabling its members to learn from each other’s 
experience (e.g., Szulanski, 1996), which shares the same principle of “copying the successful” 
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that underlies models of cumulative cultural evolution (e.g., Henrich, 2017; Heyes, 2018). 
Lastly, co-active learning emphasizes the active role of the model in building a shared 
understanding of its own experience with learners (Grecu and Becker, 1998; Myers, 2018). All 
are anchored in the basic notion of leaning from the experience of others. 
The theoretical foundations of vicarious learning lie in Albert Bandura’s work on social 
learning among children (Bandura, 1977). Subsequently, organizational scientists have 
developed an extensive literature on learning in organizational contexts that involves a focal 
actor’s observation of a “model” in action, or of the transmission of the rationale that underlies 
these actions, either in tangible documentation or through social interaction (Myers, 2018). Yet, 
these two mechanisms of vicarious learning involve fundamental differences that have been 
largely unrecognized. Learning from observing the actions and outcomes of another requires that 
these be observable. While these conditions may have been easily satisfied in work contexts that 
involved physical and collocated effort, it seems far from obvious that they can be met for the 
virtual knowledge work that characterizes large parts of the economy today (Hinds and Bailey, 
2003). Exactly what is observable about the role model may vary qualitatively across contexts: 
actions, beliefs, or outcomes. 
Access to the beliefs of others, either symbolically coded in manuals or through social 
interactions produces its own challenges. To successfully share knowledge requires more than a 
transmission of information (Axley, 1984); a substantial foundation of “common ground” – 
shared concepts and terminology – is necessary for any meaningful semantic exchange to occur 
(Bechky, 2003; Clark, 1996; Szulanski, 1996). Further, it may require two-sided interaction or 
“coactive learning”, casting the model in a more active role than as a passive exemplar (Myers, 
2018). Thus while observability of the other’s behaviour is critical for observational learning, 
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access to the rationale and thought process of the other – either in the form of social interaction 
and communication or through access to documents and artifacts – is essential for belief sharing. 
Neither is trivial to ensure. 
Finally, even if both processes – observation and belief exchange – are feasible, they are 
not necessarily equivalent in their consequences for vicarious learners. Individuals act on their 
beliefs. Therefore, observing only the actions of another necessarily conveys less information 
about the other, as the actions not taken, and their reasons for not taking them, remain hidden to 
the observer. On the other hand, the ability to share the beliefs of others certainly conveys more 
information but not necessarily knowledge, if those beliefs are erroneous. Therefore, far from 
being equivalent, the two processes of vicarious learning may be profoundly distinct in their 
consequences for the learner, as a function of (as yet) untheorized contingencies. 
Tackling these questions requires us to conceptualize the intricate interactions and 
dynamics of learning involving multiple agents. Fortunately, a well-developed body of work now 
exists in the organizational sciences on modelling individual and group learning processes 
(Lounamaa and March, 1987; Lave and March, 1993; Denrell and March, 2001; Posen and 
Levinthal, 2012; see Puranam et al., 2015 for a review). However, while prior models either 
feature observational learning (e.g. March, 1991; Lazer and Friedman, 2007; Fang, Lee, and 
Schilling, 2010) or belief sharing (e.g. Knudsen and Srikanth, 2014; Puranam and Swamy, 
2015), no explicit comparison of the two has been conducted so far.  
In the next section, we draw on this literature to formulate a formal model of vicarious 
learning that allows us to compare the relative efficacy of the two mechanisms – beliefs sharing 
and observation – across contextually important conditions. 
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MODEL STRUCTURE 
The structure of our models of vicarious learning can be understood by the following 
analogy. Imagine two HR managers in a company who are in charge of hiring employees. There 
are m types/profiles of candidates. The relative quality of profiles is unknown ex-ante. Thus, 
each manager iteratively chooses among the m alternatives based on his or her own belief, and 
they simultaneously update their beliefs based on the information they later obtained on the 
performance of the candidates they selected. Each manager makes a choice independently since 
they are in different divisions. However, they can learn vicariously either by observing each 
other’s experiences (for instance, a centralized database that allows each manager to observe the 
profiles and performance of past hires made by the other) or by sharing beliefs (a platform for 
collaborative discussion, exchange of documents, notes, etc on the understanding they have 
developed about each employee profile). In other words, in our model, each manager learns 
about candidates from two different sources of information – his own and his colleague’s 
experience (Figure 1).  
We can also interpret Figure 1 as a case of collaboration between a human manager and a 
hiring algorithm (Shrestha, Ben-Menahem, and von Krogh, 2019). For the algorithm, 
observability of past decisions implies that it’s training data includes the actions and outcomes of 
the human manager. Belief sharing could involve introducing rules and constraints on the 
algorithms based on the manager’s understanding. Conversely, the manager may learn from 
observing the actions and outcomes of the algorithm, or by trying to understand the reasons for 
the algorithm’s decisions using explainable AI technologies. 
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We now translate the above analogy into a reinforcement learning model on a multi-
armed bandit task where each agent chooses an alternative based on his or her own beliefs and 
then revises them based on the feedback for the chosen actions. In addition, each agent in our 
model faces an identical task environment – they are learning in the same context, a precondition 
for vicarious learning. Thus, our model consists of three key components: the task environment, 
each agent’s task representation, and the learning processes. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Task Environment 
In our model, the task environment is described as 𝑚 alternatives (i.e., m types of 
candidates) with different (initially unknown to the agents) expected payoffs (i.e., actual quality 
levels), which are denoted by 𝚷 = {Π1, ⋯ , Π𝑚}. In particular, we assume that the task 
environment is identical across agents in the system to allow vicarious learning. At period 𝑡, the 
realized payoff for agent i who chose alternative 𝑗 (𝜋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) is determined by the sum of the 
expected payoff (Π𝑗) and random noise (𝑢𝑖,𝑗,𝑡), drawn from the uniform distribution in (−ε, ε). 
By incorporating random noise with parameter ε, we capture the uncertain nature of the task 
environment. Note that agents may receive different payoffs even when they choose the same 
action if there exists uncertainty (i.e., ϵ > 0). In the sampling procedure, we randomize the 
expected payoffs to offset the effect of payoff distribution, but we fix the value of maximum 
payoff at Π𝑚𝑎𝑥 to make the performance of the system comparable across samples. To be 
specific, among m alternatives, only one will be assigned the value of Π𝑚𝑎𝑥, whereas payoffs for 
other alternatives will be drawn from the uniform distribution in (0, 𝛼) where 𝛼 > 0. In other 
words, 𝛼 and Π𝑚𝑎𝑥 determine the relative attractiveness of the best alternative compared to other 
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alternatives (i.e. “spikiness” of the payoff surface – or by how much the global peak exceeds the 
next largest local peak).1 
Agent’s Task Representation and Choice Rule 
Although the task environment has some objective expected values of alternatives, these 
are unknown ex-ante to both agents so that they make choices based on their own 
representations, denoted by 𝑹 = {𝑹𝟏,𝒕, 𝑹𝟐,𝒕}. Each agent’s representation consists of his or her 
own belief on the expected payoff for each alternative (i.e., 𝑹𝒊,𝒕 = {𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡} where 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2}, 𝑗 ∈
{1, ⋯ , 𝑚}, and 𝑡 ∈ {0, ⋯ , 𝑇}). At the initial stage (i.e., 𝑡 = 0), each agent possesses own beliefs 
(i.e., “priors”) on a payoff for each alternative that may arise from past experience. In particular, 
priors will be randomly drawn from the uniform distribution (0, 1). Over time, agents update 
their representations through learning processes, which will be described in the following 
section. In this regard, the agent’s representation reflects his or her belief about the task 
environment shaped by both prior and learning processes. 
Based on the above conceptualization of representation, we assume that the probability of 
choosing any alternative depends on the agent’s expected payoff for that alternative relative to 
those for other alternatives, following the softmax rule (Sutton and Barto, 2018). To be specific, 
the probability that agent 𝑖 chooses an action 𝑗 in period 𝑡 is given by: 
𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =
𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 𝜏⁄
∑ 𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 𝜏⁄𝑚𝑗=1
 
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is agent i's belief on the expected payoff for alternative 𝑗 at period 𝑡. The 
parameter 𝜏 reflects the degree of exploration in the search process (Sutton and Barto, 2018). 
                                                          
1 Note that this is not identical to “ruggedness”. 
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When 𝜏 is high, the selection of choices depends less on the subjective valuation of alternatives 
(i.e., more exploration). On the other hand, as 𝜏 decreases, the agent is more likely to choose the 
alternative believed to offer higher payoff (i.e., less exploration). In particular, when 𝜏 → 0, the 
agent is more likely to choose the alternative believed to have the highest expected payoff. 
Learning Processes 
Although priors held by the agents shape their choice in the early stage, they also learn 
from the feedback on choices they made in the past by modifying their representations in 
response to feedback. More importantly, in our model, they learn from their collaborators as well 
(i.e., vicarious learning). In particular, we examine two distinctive processes of vicarious 
learning: belief sharing and observational learning. Our model thus has three distinctive learning 
processes – (1) learning from own experience, (2) vicarious learning through belief exchange, 
and (3) vicarious learning through observation. 
Learning from own experience 
When the agents learn from their own experience, we assume that they engage in 
reinforcement learning, which has been widely adopted to describe the adaptive behaviour of 
individuals and organizations (e.g., Herriott, Levinthal, and March, 1985; Lave and March, 1993; 
Denrell and March, 2001). To be specific, the updating rule for agent 𝑖 who chose the alternative 
𝑗 and received 𝜋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 at period 𝑡 is given by: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜙(𝜋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡)                                (1) 
where 𝜋𝑗,𝑡 is the realized payoff for the alternative 𝑗 at period 𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 is the updated belief 
held by agent 𝑖 at period 𝑡 + 1. The control parameter in reinforcement learning is 𝜙 ∈ [0, 1] that 
reflects the learning rate in the updating procedure. When 𝜙 is high (i.e., fast learner), the agent 
is highly sensitive to feedback, thereby rapidly adjusting own belief (𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) toward the realized 
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payoff (𝜋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡). On the other hand, when 𝜙 is low (i.e., slow learner), the agent adjusts his own 
belief slowly.  
It is important to note the key characteristics of the above model. First of all, there exists 
the tendency to repeat actions that provided higher payoffs, whereas actions that delivered lower 
payoffs become less likely to be chosen again (i.e., Thorndike’s Law of Effect). Second, the 
agents assess and update the beliefs by comparing the realized payoffs (𝜋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) and the existing 
belief (𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡). Third, the beliefs on all unchosen alternatives remain unchanged in the following 
period. This is a widely used approach to modelling human reinforcement learning because it 
embodies three robust psychological signatures of learning: law of effect, law of recency, and the 
power law of practice (Erev and Roth, 1998). 
Learning through belief exchange 
The agents learn not only from their own experience but also from others’ experience or 
beliefs (i.e., vicarious learning). The most direct form of vicarious learning is ‘belief exchange’ 
where the agents share their beliefs through direct interaction (e.g., discussion). In other words, 
the agents can learn from others by accessing their belief systems. Given that the agents’ task 
representations in our model reflect their belief, we characterize belief exchange as a function of 
task representations held by focal and target actors. Specifically, the updating rule for agent 1 
who learns from agent 2 by accessing his or her belief system at period 𝑡 is given by: 
𝑹𝟏,𝒕+𝟏 = (1 − 𝜙𝐵𝑆)𝑹𝟏,𝒕 + 𝜙𝐵𝑆𝑹𝟐,𝒕                                   (2) 
Note that the above equation is simply the weighted average of the two belief systems (e.g., 
Friedkin, Proskurnikov, Mei, and Bullo, 2019). When the learning rate for belief sharing 𝜙𝐵𝑆 =
0, the process reduces to individual learning.  
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Learning through observation 
Even when the agent cannot access the other’s beliefs, he or she can learn from others by 
observing their actions and/or corresponding outcomes. When the agent observes both action and 
outcome, the information set obtained through observation can be treated in the same way as that 
obtained from own experience. Specifically, we assume that observational learning also follows 
the reinforcement learning. Specifically, the updating rule for agent 𝑖 who observed that the other 
agent i’ chose the alternative 𝑗 and received 𝜋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 at period 𝑡 is given by: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑂𝐿(𝜋𝑖′,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡)  where 𝑖 ≠ 𝑖′                 (3) 
where 𝜙𝑂𝐿 is a parameter for the observational learning rate. Note that the learning rate for 
observational learning (𝜙𝑂𝐿) can differ from that for direct experience (𝜙). When two agents 
choose the same action, we assume that they update corresponding belief twice with two realized 
payoffs. As there is no agent-specific effect, the order of update does not have any systematic 
effect on outcomes. 
Learning through incomplete observation 
Although we assume that the agent can observe both other’s actions and outcomes in the 
baseline model, observation may be limited to either action or outcome (i.e., incomplete 
observation). However, the agents can infer the task environment or other’s belief system even 
when the observation is incomplete. For example, when the agents observe that the other agent 
received a higher payoff then they did, they will believe that there exists a more attractive 
alternative. In turn, they are more likely to engage in exploration (i.e., inspiration-based search). 
In other words, the agent can deduce the distribution of payoffs in the task environment by 
observing other’s outcomes. To capture this process, we assume that the agent will adjust his 
exploration rate by comparing the other’s outcome with his own beliefs. To be specific, the 
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exploration rate (i.e., 𝜏) for the agent i at period 𝑡 who observed that the other agent received 
𝜋𝑗,𝑡−1 at period 𝑡 − 1 is given by: 
𝜏𝑖,𝑡 = {
𝜏𝐿  𝜋𝑗,𝑡−1 ≤ 𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1
∗
𝜏𝐻  𝜋𝑗,𝑡−1 > 𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1
∗                      (1) 
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ = max {𝑹𝒊,𝒕−𝟏} and c is a constant for the threshold. Note that, in this case, the 
other’s action (i.e., j) is unobservable. Put it simply, the agent will engage in more exploration 
(𝜏𝐻) when it observes the other’s payoff (𝜋𝑗,𝑡−1) much higher than the highest payoff in its own 
beliefs (𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ ). 
Similarly, the other agent’s behaviour plays as a cue about his or her belief system since 
the alternative that is believed to provide higher payoff is more likely to be chosen. When the 
agent observes the other’s action, the agent will consider it as an indirect indication of the 
attractiveness of that alternative, which, in turn, increases a propensity to try that alternative (i.e., 
imitation). Here, we assume that the agent adjusts own belief regarding the observed alternative 
with respect to the maximum expected return (Π𝑚𝑎𝑥). Specifically, the updating rule for the 
agent 𝑖 who observed that the other agent chose the alternative 𝑗 at period 𝑡 is given by: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑂𝐿(Π𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡)                 (2) 
Simply put, when the agent observes other’s behaviour (i.e., alternative j), it will consider that 
alternative as more attractive (i.e., increases 𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡). Overall, Table 1 describes what ego can 
observe about alter with respect to different micro-processes of vicarious learning. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
RESULTS 
We examine (1) whether vicarious learning can improve performance even without ex-
ante knowledge differential and (2) the conditions under which two baseline models of vicarious 
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learning (i.e., belief sharing and observational learning) may produce a relatively better or worse 
performance at the system level (i.e., dyad). We assess performance as the average payoffs over 
time of the two agents. The model parameters are described in Table 2. All repeated simulations 
involve 100,000 runs. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Baseline Model: A System with Vicarious Learning between Two Symmetric Agents 
As a baseline case, we first start with the analysis of the learning system with two 
baseline models of vicarious learning: observational learning (i.e., complete observation) and 
belief sharing. In particular, we assume that the system consists of two symmetric agents. By 
symmetric, we mean that the agents in the system exhibit identical learning behaviours (i.e., 
identical learning rates and exploration rates). Further, we assume ‘symmetric influence’ where 
the agents build a shared belief system by assigning identical weights to their own and other 
agents beliefs (i.e., 𝜙𝐵𝑆,1 = 𝜙𝐵𝑆,2 = 0.5). This captures coactive learning as described by Myers 
(2018) – which involves bidirectional belief sharing between learner and a role model. Finally, 
we assume that two parameters for learning from own and observation of other’s experiences are 
identical within the agent (i.e., 𝜙𝑂𝐿 = 𝜙). Figure 2 shows the learning performance of the dyad 
in terms of average payoffs over time for different modes of vicarious learning (as well as 
without vicarious learning), for model settings of m = 50, ε = 0.1, 𝜙 = 0.5, τ → 0). This is a 
particular point in the parameter space we use for illustration, and later we broaden our search.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Compared to the system without vicarious learning, we find that both modes of vicarious 
learning improve the performance of the system in initial periods. Information regarding other’s 
experiences enhances performance even when the agent does not have access to other’s belief 
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systems. Further, observational learning always outperforms individual learning, whereas belief 
sharing only initially dominates individual learning. Interestingly, we find that allowing both 
observation and belief sharing (i.e., hybrid) is not necessarily superior to limiting interaction to 
observation. Rather, our results show that the system with hybrid vicarious learning behaves 
similarly to that with belief sharing. 
Before we investigate the mechanisms underlying these results, it is worth reiterating that 
neither agent begins with better knowledge, and on average they are equally ignorant of the task 
environment. They are also symmetric in terms of their learning parameters and only differ in 
their priors (which are no more accurate than chance – note that performance begins at the same 
level in all forms of learning in Figure 2). The results thus demonstrate the benefits of vicarious 
learning even in the absence of superior wisdom ex-ante in the system (which is presumed in 
phenomena such as best practice transfer). We next turn to the reasons why vicarious learning 
produces such an advantage relative to individual learning even in the absence of ex-ante 
knowledge differentials as well as why belief sharing seems to suffer a disadvantage over time 
but observational learning does not.  
Broadly, there are two benefits of learning from the experience of others. The first is a 
fairly mundane effect of increasing sample size on cancelling out the noise in observation (i.e. 
sampling error). If in a single period two agents pick the same choice and are able to observe 
each other’s actions and outcomes, then their estimate of the expected payoff of that action 
necessarily becomes more precise. Vicarious learning thus serves as a source of “increasing 
sample size” by allowing experiences to be aggregated across agents, simply speeding up the 
learning process. However, this “increasing sample size” (or statistical efficiency of the learning 
process) is not the only driver of the superior performance of vicarious learning.  
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A second and more subtle effect arises because both observational learning and belief 
sharing can affect the impact of self-confirming biased beliefs (SCBB). There are two conditions 
under which SCBB can arise: (1) information gathered (in the form of outcomes) is contingent 
on the action chosen (i.e., own-action dependence), and (2) actions also depend on information 
obtained (e.g. rationality as consistency) (Figure 1). Under these conditions, the agent may 
construct beliefs that are self-perpetuating because acting on these beliefs leads to confirming the 
existing beliefs, which in turn shapes the subsequent action. When self-confirming beliefs are 
biased, incorrect beliefs will self-perpetuate without being falsified (i.e., self-confirming biased 
beliefs). For instance, consider an agent who believes that alternatives A and B yield 50 and 100 
units of payoff, when in reality they are worth 150 and 100 (biased beliefs). If the agents take 
actions consistent with their beliefs, they should select alternative B. The resulting outcome will 
be 100, increasing their confidence in their beliefs and making the selection of alternative A even 
less likely in the future (self-confirming the biased beliefs). 
In n-agent games, SCBB may result in self-confirming equilibria, which may deviate 
from Nash equilibria (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993; Battigalli et al., 2015). When there is no 
interdependence between agents, there are two sources of SCBB’s: erroneous priors and noisy 
feedback. For example, when the agent believes that a specific alternative is unattractive (i.e., 
negative belief), such belief will not be revised even when it is incorrect (i.e., a false-negative 
belief) since that alternative will not be sampled. On the other hand, even when the optimal 
alternative (i.e., highest expected payoff) has been sampled, the agents may deviate from that 
alternative in the subsequent periods if the realized payoff is below the expected payoff due to 
the noise in payoffs (i.e., “hot-stove” effect, Denrell and March, 2001). SCBB’s are thus a 
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superset of self-confirming equilibria (because they can exist even with a single agent) as well as 
“hot stove effects” (because they can exist even when there is no noise in payoffs).  
SCBB are distinct from sticking points, which refer to a configuration of choices such 
that, once the adaptive system arrives at the configuration, it will never deviate from it (Rivkin 
and Siggelkow, 2002). While SCBB and sticking points share a similarity in the sense that both 
are attractors (stable fixed points) of the adaptive system, the source of stability varies. On the 
one hand, sticking points arise due to the interdependency between elements of the system. An 
accurate assessment of these produces fixation for the agent. On the other hand, SCBB arise due 
to the combined properties of the agent’s mental representation and the task environment rather 
than interdependency in the task environment alone. Specifically for SCBB, the agents beliefs 
must be biased in a way that the actions they stimulate prevent the generation of evidence that 
may disconfirm the belief.  SCBB can arise even without interdependency in the task 
environment (e.g., as in our model). 
Also, SCBB differ from confirmation biases. Confirmation bias refers to “the seeking or 
interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis 
in hand (Nickerson, 1998).” In other words, it is a cognitive bias in the information processing 
process (i.e., biased search, biased interpretation, and biased memory) driven by cognitive 
heuristics and cognitive dissonance (e.g., MacCoun, 1998). However, the root cause for SCBB is 
a task environment that forces experience-based (or “endogenous”) sampling – the evidence a 
learner gathers is dependent on their action (Denrell, 2005; Sutton and Barto, 2018).  
This is because the task environment requires the learner to “sample to earn”, not merely 
“sample to learn”- payoffs to taking actions matter forcing pressures towards consistency of 
action and belief in Figure 1. Put differently, adaptively rational agents may suffer self-
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confirming biased beliefs even when they are unbiased in processing information. Indeed, studies 
have shown SCBB do not depend on the specific learning process. For instance, SCBB’s have 
been documented in models where agents follow psychologically validated learning rules (e.g., 
Denrell and March, 2001) as well as Bayesian updating (e.g., Battigalli et al., 2019; Le Mens and 
Denrell, 2011). 
There are only two ways to break SCBB. The first involves forcing the agent to take 
actions inconsistent with their own beliefs. In learning models, this is the exploration process (tuned 
by τ)2 or to provide evidence to the agent that does not arise only from the agent's own actions 
(i.e. supply information on counterfactuals). Vicarious learning instantiates the second solution, 
as we shall show, but observation and belief learning feature it to different degrees, which 
produces differences in their outcomes.  
With observational vicarious learning, each agent can also gather the information that is 
exogenous to his or her own action, thereby escaping own experience-based sampling and 
exclusive dependence on own beliefs. Unless the learners hold identical beliefs across whole 
learning periods (i.e., identical priors and learning rates, and no noise in payoffs), they will in 
general take different actions, and observing the outcomes of these actions can help to break self-
confirming biased beliefs for both. With belief sharing, each agent updates her beliefs not only 
about the action she has taken but about the entire set of alternatives, since agents will typically 
start with different beliefs. Again, this can help break SCBB. In either case, the power of 
vicarious learning comes not necessarily from the transmission of superior insight from one 
agent to another, but from diversity in (possibly erroneous) beliefs. 
[Insert Figures 3 about here] 
                                                          
2 James March memorably referred to this as a “technology of foolishness” (1976) 
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Panel A in Figure 3 illustrates these effects by plotting the joint probability for both 
learners to choose the optimal action against time for different learning systems. First of all, our 
result shows that all three systems in our model are susceptible to SCBB (i.e., the probability of 
choosing the optimal outcome is less than 1 even when T is large). Further, suffering from SCBB 
does not automatically imply poor absolute performance. Note that being stuck on a sub-optimal 
action may nonetheless yield high absolute levels of payoff (compare figures 2 and 3A), if the 
task environment is such that the difference in payoffs between the optimal and other actions is 
not large (i.e. the payoff landscape is flat, not spiked). 
More importantly, we find that the two vicarious learning systems reduce SCBB, 
measured as a stable tendency to settle on actions other than the optimal actions, but to different 
degrees (see Appendix A). Even though individual learning does improve in its ability to find 
optimal actions with increasing 𝜏 (the first path to escaping self-confirming biased beliefs), 
across all values of 𝜏, vicarious learning outperforms individual learning (indicating it is the 
second path – exposure to counterfactual information about actions not taken that primarily 
creates the advantage for either form of vicarious learning). However, belief sharing clearly loses 
its early advantage in terms of aiding discovery of optimal actions to observational learning. This 
is because it loses its ability to produce information on a wide range of counterfactual 
alternatives over time. 
To demonstrate this, Panel B in Figure 3 plots the convergence in actions across the 
agents over time for all three learning systems. Agents converge much faster to the same set of 
actions under belief sharing (because they develop similar beliefs on the value of all 
alternatives), which can reinforce self-confirming biased beliefs if the actions they believe are 
optimal are in fact not the optimal ones. In other words, other’s experience acquired through 
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belief sharing is less likely to resolve the problem of endogenous sampling compared to that in 
observational learning. 
Panel C in Figure 3 shows that this pattern of rapid convergence of actions through belief 
sharing is generally robust to different weights on own and other's beliefs in belief sharing as 
well as the exploration parameter, τ. These results explain why in Figure 2, we observe that 
vicarious learning performs better (in terms of average payoff over time) compared to individual 
learning for initial periods, but also begins to explain why belief sharing eventually 
underperforms both individual learning and observational learning. This also explains the 
surprising result in the same figure that the system with hybrid vicarious learning is not superior 
to observational learning in the long run. 
To illustrate that the increase in “sample size” created by vicarious learning alone cannot 
explain the advantage of vicarious learning, in Figure 4, we show results for all three systems 
when in each, agents always receive feedback information on all actions in every period 
(including the ones they did not select). While there is an advantage for vicarious learning in 
terms of discovering the optimal alternative, it is dissipated within very few periods. The 
persistent differences we observed in Figure 2 cannot have arisen from the pure statistical 
efficiency of vicarious learning but requires the bias reduction discussed above.  
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
Incomplete Observation 
In this section, we investigate whether the benefit of vicarious learning without ex-ante 
knowledge differential still exists even when the observation is incomplete (i.e., only the 
outcome or action of the peer is observable). Figure 5 illustrates the average cumulative learning 
performance of the system across different learning rates and modes of vicarious learning. Our 
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results show that incomplete observation can improve the learning performance of the system 
compared to isolated learners but only in certain circumstances. This is because the agent can 
infer counterfactuals based on incomplete information from others, and the relative benefit (and 
cost) of such information depends on the noise in the information generating process. On the one 
hand, when they observe other’s outcomes but not actions, learning performance increases if the 
uncertainty of the task environment is low (Figure 5a). This is because the agent can infer the 
payoff structure of the environment based on other’s performance. When they observe that 
other’s payoff is much higher than their payoffs, they are more likely to engage in exploration, 
thereby correcting SCBB (i.e., inspiration-based search). However, when the environment is 
highly uncertain, the information from others (i.e., other’s payoff) may be driven by noise, which 
incurs the opportunity cost of search without benefit.  
On the other hand, when they observe other’s actions but not outcomes, learning 
performance can be improved if the exploration rate is sufficiently low (Figure 5b). This is 
because others’ actions are likely to reflect their beliefs so that the agent can indirectly infer their 
belief systems by observing their actions. Moreover, as adaptive agents are likely to choose an 
alternative that is believed to be attractive, this information will increase the attractiveness of that 
action in a focal agent’s belief system (i.e., imitation). This again can reduce SCBB of a focal 
agent as long as they choose different alternatives. However, when the exploration rate is high, 
other’s actions may not reflect their belief systems, thereby harming the learning performance of 
the system. 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
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Exploring Contingencies: Variation in the Task Environment  
We now explore the diverse environmental conditions to understand boundary conditions 
for two baseline models of vicarious learning: observational learning (complete observation) and 
belief sharing. To assess the relative performance of two collaborative systems, we compare the 
cumulative learning performances of the system in a given period. In particular, we focus on 
three features of the task environment: the number of alternatives (i.e., search space, m), the 
payoff distribution (specifically how flat or spiky it is), and learning periods (T). We compute the 
model for all combinations of learning rates among the agents.  
The effect of the number of alternatives  
Figure 6 illustrates how the number of alternatives affects the relative learning 
performance of the two systems. Here, we also allow the system to have asymmetric learning 
rates to explore all possible parameter space. Our results show that observational learning 
outperforms belief sharing when the search space is relatively small (i.e., m is small). For 
example, when m is 10 (Figure 6a), the optimal performance of observational learning is higher 
than that of belief sharing. As the search space becomes broader, the probability of finding the 
best alternative decreases, which in turn reduces the expected return for search. Another 
interesting feature is that, in observational learning, the learning performance reaches the optimal 
level when the agents have different learning rates (i.e., asymmetric agents). This is because 
asymmetric adjustment by agents in observational learning can balance the impacts of prior and 
uncertainty on SCBB. To be specific, a slow learner (i.e., one that is less sensitive to the most 
recent outcome) provides stability in sampling, thereby reducing the impact of uncertainty on 
generating SCBB. On the other hand, a fast learner enables the system to rapidly deviate from 
false-positive beliefs, thereby reducing the impact of priors on SCBB (Please see Appendix B for 
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details). However, asymmetry is not useful for belief sharing, as beliefs are merged. On the other 
hand, when the search space is large (i.e., m is large), we find that belief sharing performs better 
than observational learning. By producing rapid convergence, belief sharing avoids fruitless 
exploration.  
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
The effect of “spikiness” in payoff distribution 
Figure 7 represents the effect of spikiness (the difference between global peak and next 
best alternative) in payoff distribution on the relative performance of two modes of vicarious 
learning. In particular, we operationalize spikiness in payoffs with two parameters (Π𝑚𝑎𝑥 and α) 
without loss of generality. The gap between the two parameters represents the extent of 
spikiness- the relative attractiveness of the best alternative compared to the next highest 
alternatives. On the one hand, when the gap between two parameters is large (i.e., high spikiness 
in payoffs), finding the best alternative becomes critical for learning performance. On the other 
hand, when the gap between two parameters is small (i.e., low spikiness in payoffs), engaging 
extensive search to find a better alternative might result in an inferior outcome due to the 
opportunity cost of search with limited benefit. Our results show that belief sharing outperforms 
observational learning when spikiness in payoffs is relatively low (Figure 7a). However, as 
spikiness in payoffs increases, observational learning dominates belief exchange in terms of the 
optimal performance (Figure 7b). The more spiky the payoff surface (i.e. the larger the 
difference between global peak and other alternative’s payoffs), the more the advantage shifts 
towards observational learning.  
[Insert Figure 7 about here] 
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The effect of learning period (T) 
Figure 8 represents the effect of learning periods (i.e., T) on the learning performance of 
two collaboration modes. In the adaptive learning process, the learning periods determine 
optimal learning behaviour. For example, when the agents face limited time for learning, 
exploring for better alternatives might lead to inferior outcomes since they might not have 
enough time to exploit those alternatives to compensate for the opportunity cost of exploration. 
Our results show that belief sharing outperforms observational learning when they encounter 
limited learning periods (Figure 8a). However, observational learning performs better than belief 
sharing when there are less time constraints (Figure 8b). 
[Insert Figure 8 about here] 
Mechanisms for Boundary Conditions 
In the previous section, we conclude that observational learning dominates belief sharing 
in redressing SCBB. However, it is important to note that SCBB do not always imply an inferior 
outcome. To find the optimal outcome, the adaptive agent may need to engage in extensive 
search, which induces the opportunity cost of exploration. We find that the system with 
observational learning has a broader search scope (i.e., exploring more alternatives) compared to 
that with belief sharing (Appendix C). In this regard, the relative advantage of observational 
learning (or belief sharing) depends on the relative benefit of correcting SCBB compared to the 
opportunity cost of an extensive search. To be specific, observational learning dominates belief 
sharing when correcting SCBB is critical for performance, whereas the advantage shifts towards 
belief sharing as the opportunity cost of correcting SCBB become prominent. 
Our analysis of the task environment captured the essential determinants of the relative 
cost of SCBB compared to the opportunity cost of exploration. For example, as search space 
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increases (m↑), the probability of finding the best alternative will decrease, thereby increasing 
the opportunity cost of correcting self-confirming biased beliefs. On the other hand, when the 
variability (spikiness) in payoffs increases, the potential gain of correcting SCBB will increase. 
Lastly, when there are less time constraints (T↑), finding the best alternative (i.e., correcting 
SCBB) becomes attractive since the system can exploit the discovered alternative for a longer 
period of time. Table 3 provides a summary of our key findings. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Robustness and Additional Analysis  
In this section, we explore whether our findings are robust to alternative model 
specifications. First of all, the updating rule we use might affect SCBB especially when there is 
noise in payoffs. In particular, simple averaging also has appeal as an instance of the Bayesian 
norm even though the updating rule in our model (i.e., exponentially recency weighted average 
or EWA) reflects an empirically derived behavioural regularity (i.e., the law of recency). We 
found that the pattern of SCBB with respect to modes of vicarious learning is robust to updating 
rules (i.e., EWA, averaging, or hybrid; see Appendix D). Also, one can argue that biased priors 
(i.e., α < 1) may lead to SCBB or that our findings may be driven solely by noise in payoffs. 
However, our finding is robust even when prior is unbiased (i.e., α = 1) and there is no noise in 
payoffs. This confirms that SCBB can arise even without noisy feedback. Moreover, unbiased 
priors, feedback without noise, and Bayesian updating even jointly do not affect our main 
findings (see Appendix E). This illustrates that SCBB is an umbrella category, which can be 
instantiated in more specific forms under particular circumstances (e.g. “hot stove” or “self- 
confirming equilibria”).  
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Second, we have limited our attention to the smallest collaborative system (i.e., two 
agents) in the previous section. Thus, we examine whether our finding is robust to system size. 
In particular, we explore learning systems with two different network topologies: random 
network and 2D lattice with Von Neumann neighborhood. In Appendix F, we show that 
vicarious learning improves the learning performance of the system even when there is no ex-
ante knowledge differential. Moreover, by using one of the contingencies we discovered (i.e., 
spikiness), we reconfirm that observational learning outperforms belief sharing especially when 
SCBB is critical. In contrast, belief sharing dominates observational learning when the 
opportunity cost of correcting SCBB is greater than its benefit. Overall, these results show that 
our findings at the dyadic level are robust even when we extend them to larger systems. 
Lastly, heterogeneity between observational learning and belief sharing may be driven 
by differences in the amount of information exchange. To be specific, agents with belief sharing 
in the baseline model exchange all dimensions of representation every period, whereas the agent 
with observational learning updates chosen actions only. This asymmetry in the amount of 
information exchange may make belief sharing more susceptible to SCBB compared to 
observation. To examine these issues, we explore whether incomplete belief sharing undermines 
SCBB further than observational learning. We find that belief sharing is still more susceptible to 
SCBB than observational learning even when they share a limited number of dimensions or share 
less frequently (Appendix G). Interestingly, the results show that sharing beliefs on chosen 
actions outperforms sharing beliefs on random actions in redressing SCBB. This is because 
beliefs on chosen actions are less likely to be biased than those on unchosen actions. Overall, 
these findings imply that the convergence in actions through sharing private beliefs is a major 
driver of our findings rather than other factors (e.g., the amount of information exchange). 
28 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, we explore two fundamental processes underlying vicarious learning. We 
show that these differ systematically in the ability to redress self-confirming biased beliefs, 
which in turn implies that their relative advantage depends on the relative benefit of correcting 
self-confirming biased beliefs compared to the opportunity cost of exploration. Put simply, 
sharing belief does not always dominate sharing observation for producing superior performance. 
Sharing private beliefs leads to the rapid convergence of actions across agents, thereby becoming 
more susceptible to self-confirming biased beliefs compared to observational learning. On the 
other hand, when vicarious learning is limited to observation, the other’s experience is more 
likely to remain exogenous to his or her own action, thereby reducing self-confirming more than 
belief sharing. This tendency provides the relative advantage of observational learning compared 
to belief sharing when overcoming self-confirming biased beliefs. However, when the benefits of 
correcting self-confirming biased beliefs become less prominent, belief sharing dominates 
observational learning.  
More broadly, our analysis contributes to theories of organizational learning by helping 
to sharply demarcate the general process of vicarious learning from its special cases such as 
imitation (i.e. a form of observational learning (e.g., Gaba and Terlaak, 2013; Posen and Chen, 
2013)), best-practice transfer (which could involve either belief exchange or observation but with 
the model presumed to have superior knowledge ex-ante (e.g., Szulanski, 1996)) and co-active 
learning (a form of belief sharing (Myers, 2018)). We show that vicarious learning is useful even 
without ex-ante differentials in wisdom among learners, and also highlight self-confirming 
biased beliefs as the theoretical mechanism that helps understand the two different processes of 
vicarious learning – observation and belief sharing- and their relative efficacy. 
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This study also contributes to the literature on the value of (cognitive) diversity by 
elucidating its role in a dynamic process of learning. While the diversity literature has 
highlighted its potential advantage in information processing, which corresponds to the noise 
cancelling function of vicarious learning, its theoretical framework has largely relied on a static 
perspective (Srikanth, Harvey, and Peterson, 2016). Filling this gap, our analyses highlight that 
diversity can be beneficial for a system not only statically but also dynamically. Having 
colleagues with heterogeneous beliefs in the vicarious learning process provides counterfactuals 
for individual learners, thereby allowing them to correct self-confirming biased beliefs. This, in 
turn, will shape their subsequent behaviors in their own learning processes.  
Moreover, our result shows that this dynamic benefit of diversity in vicarious learning 
will be amplified when interactions among team members are somewhat limited (this is in 
contrast to the emphasis on interactive learning proposed by Myers (2018)).  We know that 
initial team diversity tends to decrease over time as they interact with each other due to group 
thinking and assimilation process (Harrison, Price, Gavin, and Florey, 2002; Pelled, Eisenhardt, 
and Xin, 1999). Such a process, we show, may still produce the benefits of vicarious learning 
through belief sharing, but may underperform observational learning. Put differently, the 
empirical observation that vicarious learning often engtails rich interaction and belief sharing 
does not rule out the counterfactual (i.e. that observational learning could have done better), 
and/or may indicate that the empirical context being observed is one that has the properties that 
privilege belief sharing (i.e. large space, time limits, low spikiness). 
These results not only enhance our understanding of the mechanisms of vicarious 
learning but also have practical implications. First, given the increasing incidence of remote 
collaboration (particularly in response to the COVID19 pandemic), the role of technology has 
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become central in bridging the distance not only between actors within an organization (Ortiz de 
Guinea et al., 2012; Mesmer-Magnus, DeChurch, Jimenez-Rodriguez, Wildman, and Shuffler, 
2011) but also between actors across organizations (e.g. online communities, see Faraj, 
Jarvenpaa, and Majchrzak, 2011; Faraj, von Krogh, Monteiro, and Lakhani, 2016). However, 
from the perspective of improved vicarious learning, a fundamental design choice for organizing 
distributed work is between creating technologies that enhance observational learning (for 
instance electronic repositories and version control software that are extensively used in software 
development – Cramton, 2001; Gutwin, Penner, and Schneider, 2004), vs. those that enhance 
belief sharing (e.g. system documentation, text, voice, and video chat – Kiesler and Cummings, 
2002). Which should be preferred under what circumstances? 
Our results suggest that technologies that enable in-depth interaction are not always 
superior to those that simply enable mutual observability of actions. This contradicts a common 
belief underlying the recent effort to enhance the ability to share beliefs through technological 
development (Metcalf, Askay, and Rosenberg, 2019; Franz, Shrestha, and Paudel, 2020). Our 
findings underscore that electronic mediated collaboration (e.g. remote working) can be more 
productive with mere observability of each other’s actions and outcomes (Srikanth and Puranam, 
2014). New technologies such as Artificial Swarm Intelligence (ASI) enable a group of people to 
pool private beliefs more extensively compared to traditional methods (e.g., group discussion). 
For example, ASI allows individuals to share beliefs without requiring explicit or face-to-face 
communication, thereby overcoming the size limit as well as socio-psychological biases in group 
discussions (Metcalf et al., 2019). In contrast, algorithmic assistants combined with knowledge 
repositories can encourage observational learning by providing information regarding successful 
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actions that had been taken by others in similar contexts (Malone, 2018, p. 40). Our results also 
speak to when the former may be superior to the latter.  
Collaborative learning between humans and artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms is 
another emerging area of interest (Agrawal et al., 2018). What may uniquely distinguish 
collaborative decision making by humans and AI from other forms of automation or technology 
use is the mutual adaptation between the two (admittedly different) types of learning systems. 
Across sectors, organizations have been experimenting for a while with teams of humans and 
algorithms that learn in the same task environment while also learning vicariously from each 
other (Grecu and Becker, 1998; see Shrestha et al, 2019 for a recent review). For instance, 
human and algorithmic fund managers or HR managers might both improve their selection 
strategies by vicarious learning from each other. 
However, a basic challenge with the most sophisticated machine learning algorithms 
today lies in their explainability. Because they often rely on non-linear function approximation, 
we are limited as humans in being able to understand why the algorithm does what it does 
(Lipton, 2018; Samek, Wiegand, and Müller, 2017). This suggests that the channel of vicarious 
learning through belief sharing may be constrained in such interactions. The key design question 
again becomes one of choosing between creating technologies that improve the possibility of 
belief sharing (through explainability) at the cost of predictive power (Lipton, 2018; Gunning, 
2017) vs. simply improving the observability of the choices and outcomes that the algorithm 
(and human) experiences. Again, our results question the imperative to improve the 
explainability of AI for human-algorithm interaction (e.g., Gunning, 2017). Human-algorithm 
collaboration can be productive without explainability, under the right conditions. 
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We recognize that ours is a theoretical exercise and is, in particular, an exercise in 
normative theory. The assumptions in our theorizing are grounded strongly in the scientific 
evidence on human behaviour, but the predictions remain to be verified in future research. 
Specifically, our findings introduce testable hypotheses for contexts where collaborative learning 
occurs, and these may extend beyond the cases of remote collaboration and human-algorithm 
interaction we have discussed in detail above. For example, many organizations now engage in 
search for new ideas through crowdsourcing platforms to stay innovative (e.g., Dahlander and 
Piezunka, 2014; Gambardella, Raasch, and von Hippel, 2017). To encourage participants to share 
private beliefs, organizations often interact with them by providing feedback on their ideas 
(Franke, Keinz, and Klausberger, 2013; Piezunka and Dahlander, 2015). Our findings explain 
why in-depth interactions between organizations and crowds may result in the premature 
convergence on ideas submitted. Moreover, feedback will undermine the ability of 
crowdsourcing to correct biased beliefs of an organization as it reflects such biased beliefs and 
shapes ideas submitted by crowds. Strategic alliances often also feature collaborative learning 
processes (see Inkpen and Tsang, 2007 for a review). Our model predicts that allowing close 
interactions between firms may provide an advantage in the early stage but may result in a 
premature lock-in to an inferior solution in the long run. Empirical tests of the moderators of this 
baseline effect (such as the nature of the task environment and time constraints) can provide 
additional opportunities for falsification of the proposed theory.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. What ego can observe about alter with respect to the mode of vicarious learning 
 Belief Action Outcome 
Belief sharing Yes   
Observational 
learning 
Baseline model 
(complete observation) 
 Yes Yes 
Imitation  Yes  
Inspiration   Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 2. Model parameters for the main results 
Parameter Definition Possible values Sampled space 
𝜙 Learning rate Real number [0, 1] [0, 1] 
τ Degree of exploration Real number (0, ∞) 
0.1, 0.01, 
and τ → 0 
m The number of alternatives Positive integer  10, 50 
ε Degree of uncertainty Real number [0, ∞) 
High: 1 
Low: 0.1 
T Learning period Positive integer 1 ~ 1,000 
Πmax The maximum expected payoff Real number 1, 1.5 
α The upper bound for other alternatives Real number 0.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 3. A comparison between observational learning and belief exchange 
 Search scope 
Asymmetry in 
learning rate 
Self-confirming biased beliefs 
Boundary condition 
Due to prior 
Due to noise in 
payoffs 
Observational 
Learning 
Broad 
Increases 
performance 
Less susceptible 
Less susceptible  
(can be redressed by 
asymmetry) 
When superior 
- Narrow search space 
- High variance in payoffs (spiky) 
- Sufficient learning period 
Belief 
Exchange 
Narrow 
Decreases 
performance 
More susceptible More susceptible 
When superior 
- Broad search space 
- Low variance in payoffs (flat) 
- Limited learning period 
 
  
 
Figure 1. Illustration of vicarious learning process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2. Intertemporal pattern of learning performance (𝛕 → 𝟎 (max{𝑹𝒊}), 𝝓 =
𝟎. 𝟓, 𝚷𝒎𝒂𝒙 = 𝟏, 𝜶 = 𝟎. 𝟖, 𝛆 = 𝟎. 𝟏, T = 1,000)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3. Intertemporal behaviors of the learning system w.r.t. vicarious learning mode (𝝓 = 𝟎. 𝟓, 𝚷𝒎𝒂𝒙 = 𝟏, 𝜶 = 𝟎. 𝟖, 𝛆 = 𝟎. 𝟏)  
 𝛕 → 𝟎 (max{𝑹𝒊}) 𝛕 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 𝛕 = 𝟎. 𝟏 
Panel A. Probability of choosing 
the best alternative (SCBB) 
   
Panel B. Probability of choosing 
the same action (the convergence 
in actions across agents) 
   
Panel C. Probability of choosing 
the same action under imperfect 
belief sharing (the convergence 
in actions across agents) 
   
* The number in the parenthesis 
represents the weight on other’s belief 
 
 
  
 
Figure 5. Vicarious learning without endogenous information (𝛕 → 𝟎 
(max{𝑹𝒊}), 𝝓 = 𝟎. 𝟓, 𝚷𝒎𝒂𝒙 = 𝟏, 𝜶 = 𝟎. 𝟖, 𝛆 = 𝟎. 𝟏, T = 1,000)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 6. Learning performance of the system with incomplete observation 
(a) Observing outcome only3 
Low degree of uncertainty (ε = 0.1) High degree of uncertainty (ε = 1) 
  
 
(b) Observing action only4 
Low degree of exploration (τ = 0.01) High degree of exploration (τ = 0.5) 
  
 
                                                          
3 For this analysis, we set our parameters as follows: τ = 0.01, 𝑚 =5, 𝛼 = 0.8, Π𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1, T = 50, 𝜏𝐻 =
0.1, 𝜏𝐿 = 0.01, and 𝑐 =1.5. 
4 For this analysis, we set our parameters as follows: 𝑚 = 10, 𝛼 = 0.8, Π𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1, T = 50, 𝜏 = 0.01, and 
𝜀 = 1. 
  
 
Figure 7. The effect of search space (𝚷𝒎𝒂𝒙 = 𝟏, 𝜶 = 𝟎. 𝟖, 𝛆 = 𝟏, T = 50, and 𝛕 = 𝟎. 𝟎1)  
(a) Narrow search space (m = 10) 
   
(b) Broad search space (m = 50) 
   
  
 
Figure 8. The effect of variance in payoff distribution (i.e. spikiness) (𝒎 = 𝟓𝟎 , 𝛆 = 𝟏, T = 50, and 𝛕 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏) 
(a) Low variance (Π𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1 and 𝛼 = 0.8) 
   
(b) High variance (Π𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1.5 and 𝛼 = 0.8) 
   
  
 
Figure 9. The effect of learning periods (m = 50, 𝚷𝒎𝒂𝒙 = 𝟏, 𝜶 = 𝟎. 𝟖, 𝛆 = 𝟏, 𝛕 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏) 
(a) Limited learning period (T = 50) 
   
(b) Sufficient learning period (T = 1,000) 
   
  
 
APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A. The convergence of action within agent (switching behaviour) 
Figure A1. The probability of switching action 
(a) 𝛕 → 𝟎 (max{𝑹𝒊}) 
 
(b) 𝛕 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 
 
  
 
(c) 𝛕 = 𝟎. 𝟏 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Appendix B. Does asymmetry improve learning performance? 
In learning literature, researchers have emphasized the benefit of having 
asymmetric agents in the system. For example, March (1991) argues that agents with 
heterogeneous socialization rates enable an organization to balance exploitation and 
exploration. In addition, Lave and March (1993) contends that asymmetry in learning 
rates can redress the coordination problem. Following this tradition, we explore whether 
asymmetry in learning rates improves the learning performance of the collaborative 
learning system as well. In particular, we focus on how asymmetry balances the impacts 
of prior and uncertainty on self-confirming biased beliefs. 
Figure A2 represents the learning performance with respect to the different 
combinations of learning rates. We find that asymmetry in learning rates improves the 
learning performance of the system with observational learning (Figure A2a). This is 
because, in observational learning, slow and fast learners can complement each other. To 
be specific, a slow learner (i.e., less sensitive to the recent outcome) provides stability in 
sampling, thereby reducing the impact of uncertainty on self-confirming biased beliefs. 
On the other hand, a fast learner enables the system to rapidly deviate from false positive 
beliefs, thereby reducing the impact of prior on self-confirming biased beliefs. 
However, in the system with belief exchange (Figure A2b), asymmetric learning 
rates reduces the learning performance. This is because, in the system with belief sharing, 
the asymmetric agents cannot balance the contradictory effects of uncertainty since the 
agents build a shared belief system. Moreover, when the agents with different learning 
rates construct a shared belief system, information obtained by a fast learner outweighs 
that obtained by a slow learner. Considering that the quality of information is identical 
across the agents, assigning different weights to information will increase variance in the 
  
 
inference. This implies that a mode of vicarious learning determines the system’s ability 
to redress self-confirming biased beliefs by asymmetry. In other words, in the 
collaborative learning system, the benefit of asymmetric agents can be fully realized only 
when their belief systems are isolated. 
 
Figure A2. Learning performance of the system with asymmetric agents 
(a) Observational learning (b) Belief sharing 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Appendix C. How does vicarious learning affect the search scope? 
In this section, we examine how vicarious learning affects the search scope of the 
agent and the system. We define the search scope as the number of sampled alternatives. 
For instance, when the agent tried five different alternatives in a given period (i.e., T = 
100), the search scope will become 5. On the other hand, the search scope of the system 
is defined as a union of two agents’ search scope. For example, when the agent 1 tried 
three alternatives (1, 3, and 5) and the agent 2 tried three alternatives (1, 2, and 5), the 
search scope of the system will be 4 as four alternative was sampled by the system (i.e., 
1, 2, 3, and 5). Figure A3 shows that the system with observational learning tends to have 
a broader search scope than belief sharing. Interestingly, we find that vicarious learning 
curtails the search scope at both levels. This implies that vicarious learning improves the 
effectiveness of search given that it also increases the probability to find the best 
alternative (Figure 3). 
Figure A3. Vicarious learning and the search scope of the agent and the system5 
 
                                                          
5 For this analysis, we set our parameters as follows: 𝜙 = 0.5, m = 50, 𝛼 = 0.8, ε = 1, T = 100. 
  
 
Appendix D. Different updating rules and self-confirming biased beliefs 
Figure A4. Self-confirming biased beliefs with respect to updating rules (𝛕 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏) 
(a) EWA – EWA 
 
(b) Averaging – EWA 
 
 
  
 
(c) Averaging – Averaging 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Appendix E. Unbiased prior and feedback without noise 
Figure A5. Self-confirming biased beliefs with EWA 
(a) 𝛕 → 𝟎 
 
(b) 𝛕 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 
 
 
  
 
(c) 𝛕 = 𝟎. 𝟏 
 
 
Figure A6. Self-confirming biased beliefs with Bayesian updating (averaging) 
(a) 𝛕 → 𝟎 
 
 
  
 
(b) 𝛕 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 
 
 
(c) 𝛕 = 𝟎. 𝟏 
 
 
 
  
 
Appendix F. Larger systems with vicarious learning 
Figure A5a. Random network (ER model with n = 100, p = 0.02)6 
When the self-confirming biased beliefs is critical (𝛱𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2) 
 
When the self-confirming biased beliefs is less critical (𝛱𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1) 
 
                                                          
6 For this analysis, we set our parameters as follows: τ = 0.01, m = 50, 𝛼 = 0.8, ε = 1, T = 100. 
  
 
Figure A5b. 2D lattice with Von Neumann neighbourhood (5X5) 
When the self-confirming biased beliefs is critical (𝛱𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2) 
 
When the self-confirming biased beliefs is less critical (𝛱𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Appendix G. Incomplete belief sharing and self-confirming biased beliefs 
Figure A8. Self-confirming biased beliefs with respect to belief sharing 
(a) Sharing a limited number of dimensions (𝛕 → 𝟎) 
 
(b) Belief sharing with different frequencies (𝛕 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏) 
 
